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Abstract
This document describes the aggregation and anonymization process applied to the initial version of
Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports (published at http://google.com/covid19/mobility on
April 2, 2020), a publicly available resource intended to help public health authorities understand what
has changed in response to work-from-home, shelter-in-place, and other recommended policies aimed at
flattening the curve of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our anonymization process is designed to ensure that
no personal data, including an individual’s location, movement, or contacts, can be derived from the
resulting metrics.
The high-level description of the procedure is as follows: we first generate a set of anonymized metrics
from the data of Google users who opted in to Location History. Then, we compute percentage changes
of these metrics from a baseline based on the historical part of the anonymized metrics. We then discard
a subset which does not meet our bar for statistical reliability, and release the rest publicly in a format
that compares the result to the private baseline.
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports provide insights into changes in mobility patterns. These reports
use anonymized, aggregated data to chart movement trends over time by geography, as well as by place
categories, showing trends over several weeks. This works in a similar way to existing Google products and
features. For example, Google Maps uses aggregated, anonymized data to show how busy certain types
of places are, including when a local business tends to be the most crowded. Public health officials have
suggested this same type of aggregated, anonymized data could also be helpful as they make critical decisions
to combat COVID-19.
The COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports provide insights into what has changed in response to work-
from-home, stay-at-home, and other recommended policies aimed at flattening the curve of the COVID-19
pandemic. They analyze trends in visits made to high-level categories of places, including workplaces, retail
and recreational venues, groceries and pharmacies, parks, transit centers, and places of residence. Each
version of the report will show trends over several weeks, with the most recent data representing 48 hours
prior.
As explained in greater technical detail below, the anonymization process for these reports includes
differential privacy [1], which is well-suited to produce analytics in contexts where the categories of data
are known in advance. Our rigorous approach intentionally adds random noise to metrics in a way that
maintains both users’ privacy and the overall accuracy of the aggregated data.
This paper is structured as follows: we introduce our method to produce anonymized metrics with
differential privacy. We then explain how we post-process the anonymized metrics to generate the reports.
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1 Definitions
Location History users The metrics in these reports are based on the data of Google users who have
opted in to Location History [2], (“LH users”), a feature which is off by default.
Differential Privacy [3] Let ε be a positive real number and A be a randomized algorithm that computes
a metric. In the context of this report, A is considered ε-differentially private if for all input datasets D1
and D2 such that D2 can be obtained from D1 by adding or removing a single user, and for all subsets of
S ∈ imA:
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) · Pr[A(D2) ∈ S].
Granularity levels The metrics are aggregated per day and per geographic area. There are three levels
of geographic areas; in this paper, we call these granularity levels.
• Granularity level 0 corresponds to metrics aggregated by country / region.
• Granularity level 1 corresponds to metrics aggregated by top-level geopolitical subdivisions (e.g. US
states).
• Granularity level 2 corresponds to metrics aggregated by higher-resolution granularity (e.g. U.S. Coun-
ties).
Granularity levels 1 and 2 are defined differently in different countries, to account for knowledge of local
public-health needs. Note that in general, the geographic area represented gets smaller as the Granularity
number increases. No metrics are published for geographic regions smaller than 3km2.
2 Generating anonymized metrics
We are releasing aggregated, anonymized data that is designed to ensure that no personal data, including
an individual’s location, movement, or contacts, can be derived from the resulting metrics. To that end,
we anonymize the statistics with differential privacy. We query the underlying data using our open-source
differential privacy library [4], which adds Laplace noise [5] to protect each metric with differential privacy.
2.1 Daily visits in public places
We count the number of unique LH users who visited a public place of a given category in a given day at
each granularity level. There are seven different categories derived from the data: retail, recreation, eateries
(reported as part of “Retail & recreation”); groceries, pharmacies; transit; and parks. We add Laplace noise
to each count according to the following table.
Granularity level Scale of Laplace noise Corresponding ε parameter
0 1/0.11 ≈ 9.09 (σ ≈ 12.86) 0.11
1 1/0.11 ≈ 9.09 (σ ≈ 12.86) 0.11
2 1/0.22 ≈ 4.55 (σ ≈ 6.43) 0.22
Table 1: Noise parameters used for the daily visits in public places metrics
For each location (at all geographic levels), each LH user can contribute at most once to each category.
We also bound the contribution of each LH user to 4 <category,location> pairs per day and per geographic
level, using a process similar to the one described in this paper [6]: if an LH user contributes to more than
4 pairs in a given day and given geographic level, we randomly select 4 of them, and discard the others.
For example, suppose that on the same day, an LH user goes to public places in all 7 categories in two
distinct neighboring countries. This makes a total of 14 <category,location> pairs at country level. We
would randomly discard 10 of these pairs when computing country-level statistics.
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This process does not significantly affect data accuracy: in the US, at county level, 99% of LH users
contribute 3 or fewer <category,place> pairs per day on average. Thus, each daily place visit is protected by
differential privacy with ε = 0.44, and the total daily contribution of each user with a maximum of ε = 1.76.
2.2 Residential
For the purposes of this analysis, we use signals like relative frequency, time and duration of visits to calculate
metrics related to places of residence. We calculate an average amount of time spent at places of residence for
LH users in hours. This computation is performed for each day and geographic area, using the differentially
private mean mechanism from our open-source library [7]. This mechanism works as follows:
• We compute the amount of time spent at place of residence in a given day and geographic area in
hours by summing up the individual values per user offset by 12, so all individual values fall into the
range [−12; 12]. We then add Laplace noise to this sum; the scale of the noise is indicated in the table
below. We denote the real sum S, and noisy sum NS.
• We compute the count of unique users who spent any time at residences in a given day and geographic
area. We then add Laplace noise to this count; the scale of the noise is indicated in the table below.
We refer to the real count C, and the noisy count NC.
• Finally, we compute the ratio NS/NC for each day and each geographic area, add 12 as offset and
clamp it to the range [0, 24] hours/day.
For example, at county-level, NS is obtained by first sampling a random number from a Laplace distribution
of scale 109.1, and then adding that number to S. In the table below, we also indicate the standard deviation
σ of the noise added to each value.
Granularity level Scale of Laplace noise: Scale of Laplace noise: Corresponding
sum (total hours/day) count (number of users) ε parameter
0 12/0.055 ≈ 218.2 (σ ≈ 308.6) 1/0.055 ≈ 18.2 (σ ≈ 25.71) 0.11
1 12/0.055 ≈ 218.2 (σ ≈ 308.6) 1/0.055 ≈ 18.2 (σ ≈ 25.71) 0.11
2 12/0.110 ≈ 109.1 (σ ≈ 154.3) 1/0.110 ≈ 9.09 (σ ≈ 12.86) 0.22
Table 2: Noise parameters used for the residential metrics
Each user can contribute to at most one region per granularity level, which protects these metrics by
differential privacy with ε = 0.44 total budget across all granularities. A description of the differentially
private mean mechanism implemented and a proof of its privacy guarantees is described in [8] (Algorithm
2.4).
2.3 Workplaces
For the purposes of this analysis, we use signals like relative frequency, time and duration of visits to calculate
metrics related to places of residence and places of work of LH users. We calculate how many LH users spent
more than 1 hour at their places of work. This computation is performed for each day and geographic area.
Then, we add Laplace noise to each count according to the following table.
Geographic level Scale of Laplace noise Corresponding ε parameter
0 1/0.11 ≈ 9.09 (σ ≈ 12.86) 0.11
1 1/0.11 ≈ 9.09 (σ ≈ 12.86) 0.11
2 1/0.22 ≈ 4.55 (σ ≈ 6.43) 0.22
Table 3: Noise parameters used for the work places metrics
The count is aggregated by places of residence of LH users. Since each user can contribute to at most
one geographic area per granularity level, these metrics are protected by differential privacy with ε = 0.44.
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3 Generating the report from the anonymized metrics
The metrics described above are generated for each day, starting on 2020-01-01. They are then used to
generate the percentage changes relative to day of the week published in the reports. All operations described
below use only the output of the differentially private mechanisms described in the previous section; so they
do not consume any privacy budget.
Additional privacy protections We discard all metrics for which the geographic region is smaller than
3km2, or for which the differentially private count of contributing users (after noise addition) is smaller than
100. Geographic regions smaller than 3km2 may be merged such that the union of their area is above the
3km2 threshold. This merging does not occur across country boundaries, except for the Vatican City and
Italy.
3.1 Computing percentage changes from a baseline
For each individual metric generated using the mechanisms described above, we compute the ratio between
the metric for a given day D and the same metric computed for the baseline period. The reference baseline
is defined in the following way.
• We consider the 5-week range from 2020-01-03 through 2020-02-06.
• Within this 5-week range, we consider the 5 days with the same day of week as D. For example, if D is
2020-03-20, D is a Friday, so we consider the 5 Fridays in this 5-week range (Jan 3 to Jan 31, inclusive).
• We compute the median of the differentially private metrics for these 5 baseline days.
• This median metric is the baseline metric for D.
We then compute and publish the ratio between the metric for D and the baseline metric, as a percentage.
3.2 Removing unreliable metrics for Residential, Workplace, Transit, and Parks
In some regions, the noise added to obtain differential privacy can reduce the confidence that we are capturing
a meaningful change, typically when there is not a lot of data for the metric. When, because of this
uncertainty, the percentage change for one of these metrics has a 5% chance (or higher) of being wrong by
more than ±10 absolute percentage points, we do not publish it and instead include an asterisk denoting
that there is not enough data available to present privacy-safe information. More precisely:
• Before releasing a ratio metric/baseline, we compute 97.5% confidence intervals for the metric and its
baseline. Let us denote [metric min, metric max] and [baseline min, baseline max] these respective
confidence intervals.
• We compute the ratios metric min/baseline max and metric max/baseline min.
• If one of these ratios differs from the differentially private ratio by more than 10 absolute percentage
points, we do not publish the corresponding percentage changes.
If the last condition is not satisfied, then the probability of being wrong by more than 10 absolute percentage
points in each direction is lower than 2.5%. By union bound, this means that there is at most a 5% risk of
being wrong by more than 10 absolute percentage points. Note that the confidence intervals are based on
an already differentially private value and on public data (the scale and shape of the noise), so no privacy
budget is consumed by this operation.
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